In order to design an exceptionally efficient mix network, both asymptotically and in real terms, we develop the notion of almost entirely correct mixing, and propose a new mix network that is almost entirely correct. In our new mix, the real cost of proving correctness is orders of magnitude faster than all other mix nets. The trade-off is that our mix only guarantees "almost entirely correct" mixing, i.e it guarantees that the mix network processed correctly all inputs with high (but not overwhelming) probability. We use a new technique for verifying correctness. This new technique consists of computing the product of a random subset of the inputs to a mix server, then require the mix server to produce a subset of the outputs of equal product. Our new mix net is of particular value for electronic voting, where a guarantee of almost entirely correct mixing may well be sufficient to announce instantly the result of a large election. The correctness of the result can later be verified beyond a doubt using any one of a number of much slower proofs of perfectcorrectness, without having to mix the ballots again.
INTRODUCTION
A mix server is the cryptographic equivalent of a hat. It takes a set of input ciphertexts and outputs related ciphertexts in a random order, in such a way that the permutation that matches input to output ciphertexts is known only to the mix server and no one else. Mix servers were originally proposed by Chaum [5] to implement an untraceable email system, and have since found a wide range of applications. They are notably being used to ensure privacy in electronic voting [22, 26, 12] and anonymous payment systems [14] .
To be useful, a mix server must prove that it has correctly mixed the set of input ciphertexts. That is, a mix server must prove that the set of ciphertexts it outputs matches exactly the set of input ciphertexts it received. Ideally, this proof should not reveal any additional information about the relationship between inputs and outputs. If we consider the example of a mix server mixing votes after an election, the proof of correct mixing guarantees that the mix server neither lost, nor added, nor modified any vote.
Proving that the output of a mix is a permutation of the inputs without compromising the secrecy of the permutation is not easy. The first solutions to this problem were based on computationally expensive zero-knowledge proofs. Much work has since been devoted to making the proofs more efficient both asymptotically and in real terms (we review related work in the following section). However, even the fastest mix [20] is still too slow to prove correctness in real time when the number of inputs is large. For instance, we estimate that to prove that one million votes have been mixed correctly would require some 20 hours on a 1GHz PC. In effect, existing mix servers are too slow to mix non-trivial numbers of inputs in real time.
In this paper, we propose an exceptionally efficient new method for proving that the output produced by a mix network is almost entirely correct. The real cost of generating a proof of almost entirely correct mixing, measured by the number of exponentiations required, is a small constant independent of the number of inputs mixed. In practice, our new mix produces an instant proof of almost entirely correct mixing. In comparison, the fastest proofs of perfectly correct mixing require work linear in the number of inputs.
Almost entirely correct mixing means that the mix network provably processed correctly all inputs with high (but not overwhelming) probability. For example, a typical application of our mix would be to give an instant proof that the outcome of an election involving one million ballots is correct with probability 99%. This guarantee may well be enough to announce the result of the election early, while a much slower perfectly correct proof runs to validate the result beyond a doubt.
We use a new technique to verify that the output of a mix server is almost entirely correct. This new technique consists of first computing the product π S of a random subset S of the inputs of the mix server, then revealing the subset S to the mix server and requesting it to produce a subset S of the outputs such that π S = πS. Observe that an honest mix server can find S simply by applying to S the permutation that matches mix inputs to mix outputs. On the other hand, we will show in sections 6 and 7 that the problem of finding S such that π S = πS becomes often impossible if the set of outputs produced by the mix server is not a permutation of the inputs.
The most important application of our new proof is in large electronic elections (with one million votes or more), where it may be used to guarantee almost instantly that the output produced by the mix is almost entirely correct. This guarantee will often be enough to announce the result of the election instantly. We can use in parallel to our proof any one of a number of slower proofs of perfect-correctness without having to mix the ballots again (the voters themselves, of course, need not be involved again). What makes this possible is that our proof works with the fastest and also most common implementation of mix networks: ElGamal re-encryption mix nets (see section 2.1).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define mix networks and their properties, as well as re-encryption mix nets. In section 3, we survey existing techniques for proving the correct execution of mix nets. We introduce our mechanism for proving almost entirely correct mixing in section 4. In section 5, we propose a new mix network protocol based on a proof of almost entirely correct mixing and examine the properties of this mix net in section 6. In section 7, we prove that our mix net is almost entirely correct. We conclude in section 8.
MIX DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES
A mix server takes as input a set of ciphertexts and outputs in a random order re-encryptions of these ciphertexts. A re-encryption of a ciphertext is a different ciphertext that decrypts to the same plaintext. We describe later in this section the encryption scheme used by mix servers and the re-encryption process. The main property desired of a mix server is that the permutation that matches input ciphertexts to output re-encryptions should be known to no one but the mix server itself.
Mixing typically involves not one but several mix servers that operate sequentially on the same data. This is called a mix network or mix net. Consider a mix net that consists of n servers. Users submit encrypted inputs to the mix network. These inputs are mixed in a random order by the first mix server. The output of this first mix server is passed to the second mix server, which mixes it again and passes it to the third mix server which mixes it yet again, and so on until the output of the n-th server becomes the final output of the mix net. The relationship between inputs and outputs of a mix net is not known to any single server, but could only be learnt by a coalition of all the servers.
As is customary, we model all communication between users and mix servers, as well as among mix servers with a bulletin board. The bulletin board is a publicly shared piece of memory to which all participants have read access and appendive, sequential write access with authentication. We further assume that all participants (users and servers) have polynomially bounded computational resources. We consider an adversary that may statically control any number of users and up to all the mix servers minus one. (We refine and justify this adversarial model in section 3). Given these assumptions, we require the following security properties of a mix network:
• Correctness: the set of ciphertexts output by the mix network must "match" the set of input ciphertexts. This means that every output is a re-encryption of an input, and no two outputs are re-encryption of the same input.
• Privacy: no adversary can match any output of the mix network to the corresponding input with probability better than 1/n where n is the number of inputs. Our mixnet guarantees a slightly weaker notion of privacy as explained in section 6.
• Robustness: the mix network must produce a correct output irrespective of possible server faults or failures.
• Universal verifiability: a mix net is universally verifiable if a coalition of all users and all mix servers only ever succeeds in convincing an outside verifier of the correct execution of a mix network when the mix network was indeed executed correctly. Note that universal verifiability uses a stronger adversarial model than that used to define privacy and correctness, since all mix servers may participate in the coalition to cheat an outside verifier.
• Efficiency: while not a security property, low computational overhead is the holy grail of secure mix networks.
Re-encryption Mix Nets
In this section, we define re-encryption mix networks. Reencryption mix nets were originally proposed in [22] . The particular re-encryption mix of [22] was broken in [24, 25] , and later fixed by [21] . A very large number of constructions based on re-encryption mix nets have since been proposed (we will survey them briefly in the following section).
Re-encryption mix networks operate in two distinct phases. In the first phase (the mixing phase), the input ciphertexts are shuffled and re-encrypted. In the second phase (the decryption phase), the mixed ciphertexts that are the output of the first phase are decrypted. The servers that perform the mixing in the first phase, and the servers that perform the decryption in the second phase need not be the same, although they can be the same. We treat them separately in order to define our adversarial model more clearly. We call the first group mixing servers and the second group decryption servers. This static adversarial model is commonly considered, but it will be particularly appropriate for the mix net we propose. Since our mixing is so fast, it is not practically important to consider dynamic adversaries. The same may not be true for slower mixes, making such schemes possibly weaker or more complicated. As we shall see, the involvement of decryption servers is very much more limited than that of [13, 27] 
RELATED WORK
The main difficulty of re-encryption mixnets lies in designing computationally efficient ways for mix servers to prove that they mixed and re-encrypted their inputs correctly in the mixing phase. We survey here some techniques that are representative of the progress made and compare the efficiency of these techniques in Figure 1 . The table in Figure 1 compares the real cost per server (for a total of k servers) of mixing n items. The cost is expressed as the number of exponentiations required to re-encrypt the inputs, verify correctness and decrypt the outputs. We do not take into account the cost of operations such as additions and multiplications that are much faster to perform than exponentiations. Where applicable, the table also mentions what trade-off is made for efficiency.
The first methods to prove the correctness of the mixing were based on cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proofs [26, 21, 1] . Though much work went into designing efficient customized zero-knowledge proofs, these schemes remain computationally expensive. To make the proofs more efficient, an approach proposed independently by Millimix [16] and MIP-2 [2, 3] is to decompose a permutation on n elements into n log n pairwise permutations called comparitors. The mix server then proves correct execution of all the comparitors one by one, which can be done efficiently with a variant of the Chaum-Pedersen [6] protocol that proves equality of discrete logarithms. The schemes recently proposed by Furukawa and Sako [9] , and Neff [20] offer yet more efficient proofs of correct mixing.
We now compare in more detail our new mix net to the two schemes to which it is closest: Randomized Partial Checking [18] and Optimistic Mixing [11] . Randomized Partial Checking (RPC) trades-off some privacy for more efficiency: correctness is verified by asking each mix server to reveal a randomly selected fraction of its input/output relations. This guarantees with high probability that all but an exponentially small number of inputs were processed correctly by the mix server. On the downside, RPC offers a weaker guarantee of privacy. Since each mix server reveals a fraction of its input/output relations, privacy becomes a global property of the mix network: a majority of honest mix servers is required to ensure privacy, rather than a single mix server. To achieve the same confidence in privacy, RPC requires the involvement of many more servers than the schemes we have previously surveyed.
While our mix net bears some resemblance to RPC, it exploits mostly a different trade-off. RPC trades off mostly privacy (and some correctness) for efficiency, while our scheme trades off mostly correctness (and a little privacy) for efficiency. Contrary to RPC, a mix server in our scheme does not reveal individual relationships between inputs and outputs, but only the global relationship between a large subset of the inputs and a large subset of the outputs. Like RPC, our mix offers perfect privacy if there is an honest majority of mix servers. But unlike RPC, our mix preserves some privacy even when there is only a single honest mix server. In the case of a single honest mix server, as we show in section 6, every input is hidden among n/2 α outputs on average, where n is the total number of inputs and α is the security parameter (e.g. α = 4). On the downside, our mixnet does not guarantee perfect correctness but must rely on the parallel execution of a slower verification protocol to guarantee perfect correctness.
Finally, a proof technique similar to ours is used in [11] to build a mix network with different properties. The proof of correctness in [11] consists of a proof that the product of all the inputs equals the product of all the outputs of the mix server. This, combined with redundancy checks in the inputs, guarantees perfect correctness. As in our scheme, the cost of the proof is independent of the number of inputs mixed. But on the downside, the redundancy checks in the inputs (which guarantee perfect correctness) result in a cost of mixing and decrypting that is more than twice as high as in all other re-encryption mix networks.
To summarize, our mix has the lowest total computational overhead for mixing n inputs. In particular the number of exponentiations required to prove correct mixing is a constant independent of the number of inputs. Our scheme guarantees only almost entirely correct mixing: any error in the output is detected with probability 99% whereas perfectly correct mixes provide standard guarantees of correctness of 1 − 2 80 . Our scheme also trades off a little privacy (see section 6).
PROOF OF ALMOST ENTIRELY COR-RECT MIXING
To illustrate the key idea of our proof of almost entirely correct mixing, we introduce first the following simple problem. Consider a prover who is committed to two sets of n elements: m 1 , . . . , m n ∈ G and m 1 , . . . , m n ∈ G. This prover wants to convince a verifier that there exists a permutation ϕ on n elements such that for all i, m i = m ϕ(i) . In other words, the prover must convince the verifier that the set {m i } n i=1 is a permutation of the set {m i } n i=1 . In addition, the prover must reveal no information about the sets {mi} n i=1 and {m i } n i=1 and as little information as possible about the permutation ϕ. We assume that the prover is computationally bounded.
We propose the following approach:
1. The verifier chooses a random subset of indices S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} (note that |S| ≈ n/2 with high probability).
The prover reveals to the verifier the set S = ϕ(S) defined as ϕ(S) = {ϕ(s)|s ∈ S}.
The verifier checks that |S| = |S |.
The prover shows that
We assume that this can be done without revealing anything about the m i or m i . The verifier is satisfied if this product equality holds.
There are a few important observations to make about this approach:
• A prover who knows a permutation ϕ such that for all i, m i = m ϕ(i) will always trivially succeed in steps 2 and 3.
• Consider a malicious prover who does not have a permutation ϕ such that for all i, m i = m ϕ(i) . This prover must find a set S such that |S| = |S | and
We prove in section 7 that if the set {m i } is not a permutation of the set {mi}, then the probability that the prover can find a set S with the desired properties in polynomial time is at most 5/8, or else the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in polynomial time in G.
• The proof leaks a little bit of information about the permutation ϕ. Given S and S = ϕ(S), the verifier knows that ϕ(i) ∈ S if and only if i ∈ S. This is acceptable for mix network applications, considering the number of inputs m i is typically large, so that being hidden among about half the outputs is sufficient.
Applications to ElGamal re-encryption mixes. ElGamal re-encryption mix networks were defined in section 2.1. Recall that the inputs to a mix server are ElGamal ciphertexts. The mix server mixes these inputs, re-encrypts them, and outputs a new set of ElGamal ciphertexts. Following the example above, we propose to verify that the inputs were mixed correctly by first computing the product of a randomly selected subset S of the inputs, then giving S to the mix server and asking it to produce a subset S of the outputs whose product is the same. To make this proof technique work with ElGamal ciphertexts, we need the following two propositions: 
OUR NEW MIX NET
In this section, we integrate our proof of almost entirely correct mixing in the design of the ElGamal re-encryption mix network and give a detailed description of the resulting mix network protocol.
Setup. The decryption servers jointly generate the parameters (q, g, x, y) of an ElGamal cryptosystem in a group G of prime order q generated by g. The private key x such that y = g x is shared among all decryption servers in a (t, k) secret sharing scheme. This may be done using for example the (t, k)-threshold key generation protocol of Pedersen. This setup step is executed only once. After that, the same parameters can be used to mix any number of input batches. The parameters of the ElGamal cryptosystem need only be generated anew if new servers join the mix or existing servers leave the mix.
Submission of inputs.
• The servers publish the public ElGamal parameters that were generated in the setup phase.
• Users submit their inputs to the mix net encrypted with ElGamal. Let m i be the input of user U i . For simplicity, we assume that m i ∈ G. User U i encrypts mi and posts the resulting ciphertext (g r , mi · y r ) to the mix net's bulletin board. Users must also prove knowledge of m i (see section 2.1)
• The mix servers agree on a security parameter α > 0, where α is a small integer (say, α ≤ 5). Higher values of α provide a stronger guarantee of correct mixing but offer less privacy to the users. We examine this trade-off in detail in the next section.
Re-randomization and Mixing. The first mix server reads users' input ciphertexts from the bulletin board, re-randomizes the ciphertexts, and writes them back to the bulletin board in random order. One by one all other mix servers perform the same operation. The output written to the bulletin board by one mix server becomes the input to the next mix server, until each server has performed the following mix step exactly once:
1. Mix server Mj reads as inputs n ElGamal ciphertexts
2. M j re-randomizes these ciphertexts to produce
3. Mj outputs these new ciphertexts to the bulletin board in random order: C ϕ j (i) , where ϕ j is a random permutation on n elements chosen by mix server M j . Mix server M j is required to remember the permutation ϕ j and the re-randomization factors r i until the verification step which we describe next is complete. The permutation ϕ j and the re-randomization factors should of course be kept secret.
Verification.
Mix servers are not allowed to abort at any time during the verification. A mix server that does abort is accused of cheating.
Before verification starts, all servers jointly generate a random string r which will be used to generate random challenges. The string r is generated as follows. Each mix server Mj selects a random string rj and commits to rj using a non-malleable commitment scheme [8] . After all commitments are received, they are opened. The random string r is computed as r = ⊕ j r j .
Next, each server in turn must prove that it re-randomized and mixed the ciphertexts correctly. The following 6 steps are repeated individually for each server. The verification step for server M j proceeds as follows. As above, let
1. We first verify that all C i are properly formatted, i.e.
every C i consists of a pair (s, t) ∈ G 2 . Observe that this can be done efficiently. If G is a subgroup of Z * p , the computational cost to verify that an element belongs to G is one exponentiation, but the verification for all C i can be batched (see [4] ), resulting in a cost of a single exponentiation to verify all C i . If G is the group of points of an elliptic curve over Fp of prime order q, the computational cost to verify that a point is on the curve is one squaring and one cubing.
Using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol (proposition 4.2), mix server Mj proves that
All mix servers collaborate to generate α sets S 1 , . . . , S α , where each set Si is a subset of {1, . . . , n}. The sets Si are generated independently of one another in the following manner. Every index 1 ≤ k ≤ n is included in S i independently at random with probability 1/2. The randomness is derived from the random string r generated jointly by all servers at the beginning of the verification step. We examine in more detail how to generate the subsets S i at the end of this section.
4. The sets S1, . . . , Sα are given to mix server Mj.
Mix server
This product equality is proved using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol. 6 . If the mix server fails in step 5, it is accused of cheating.
The decryption servers are then called upon to inspect the transcript of the verification (steps 3, 4 and 5) on the bulletin board. If cheating is confirmed by the decryption servers, the cheating mix server is banned from any future mixing. In this case, the remaining honest servers restart the whole mixing from the beginning using the original ciphertext inputs posted by users to the bulletin board.
Decryption.
The mix network proceeds to the decryption step only if the verification step did not expose any cheating servers. A quorum of decryption servers jointly performs a threshold decryption of the final output ciphertexts, and provides a zero-knowledge proof of correctness for decryption.
Perfectly-correct proof. If a proof that the mix net operated perfectly correctly is required, we may run a slower perfectly-correct verification step, such as for example that proposed by Neff [20] . The cost of this additional verification is not included in the analysis of our new mix net.
This completes the description of our new mix net. We end this section with a description of how to generate the sets S 1 , . . . , S α in step 3 of the verification phase.
Optimization for the generation of challenges. Recall that we denote by r the randomness jointly generated by all the servers before the verification started. Let h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 160 be a hash function. In our security analysis, we model h as a random oracle. Let B be the content of the bulletin board just before the sets S i are generated (i.e. everything that has been posted to the bulletin board up to that point). We use the master randomness r and the string B together with the hash function h to generate the sets S1, . . . , Sα using the following rule: index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is included in S i for mix server M j if and only if the least significant bit of h(r||B||j||i||k) is 1, where || denotes string concatenation.
PROPERTIES
In this section, we examine the properties of our new mix net in terms of soundness, efficiency, robustness, privacy, correctness and finally universal verifiability.
Soundness Proposition 6.1. (Soundness) Our mix net is sound, in the sense that a server who does not deviate from the protocol cannot fail the verification step.
Proof. A mix net who submits S = ϕ j (S) can not fail the verification test. Recall from proposition 2.1 that our adversarial model allows the adversary to control at most all but one of the mix servers, and up to a minority of decryption servers. The involvement of the decryption servers when cheating is alleged (step 6 of the verification) guarantees soundness since a majority of them is honest. (Were it not for decryption servers, a majority of cheating mix servers could evict a minority of honest mix servers.)
Efficiency
Proposition 6.2. (Efficiency) The cost of mixing n items is 2n exponentiations per mix server. The cost of proving that the mixing is almost entirely correct is 2α(2k − 1) exponentiations per mix server and the cost of decrypting n outputs is (2 + 4k)n, where k is the total number of mix servers.
As discussed in section 3, our mix has the lowest total computational overhead to mix n inputs. In particular the number of exponentiations required to prove that mixing has been done correctly is a constant independent of the number of inputs. 
Robustness

Privacy
Proposition 6.4. (Privacy) Every input is hidden among n/2 α outputs on average.
Proof. In the verification step, each mix server must reveal the image by his secret permutation of α sets S1, . . . , Sα, each of size on average n/2. Every input belongs either to S i or to the complement of S i , and thus the corresponding output belongs either to the image of S i or to the image of the complement of S i . The intersection of the images of α sets Si (or their complements) is on average of size n/2 α . This is the minimum privacy guaranteed by our mix network, given that we consider an adversarial model in which all but one of the mix servers may be controlled by the adversary. If we adopt a weaker adversarial model and assume that a majority of mix servers are honest, we can adapt the techniques of [18] to our mix network to guarantee perfect privacy for all the inputs with overwhelming probability. The proof of almost entirely correct mixing is fairly involved and is given in the next section. Let us consider a concrete example. Consider an election with 160, 000 ballots. A security parameter α = 6 guarantees that every individual ballot is hidden among 2, 500 others. By proposition 6.5, the probability that the output set computed by the mix network is a permutation of the inputs is more than 94%.
Correctness
Universal Verifiability
Our mix offers no guarantee of universal verifiability. We have already noted that a slower proof of perfect correctness should be executed in parallel with our proof and we assume that universal verifiability, if required, will come from that slower proof. We note that while it is important that the results of the election be available instantly (with our proof), it is acceptable to wait longer (a day) for a proof of universal verifiability (with another, slower proof).
PROOF OF CORRECTNESS (PROPOSI-TION 6.5)
In this section we prove Proposition 6.5 (almost entirely correct mixing). Throughout this section, we let G be a group of prime order q and Z q = {0, . . . , q − 1}. 
Proof. By relabelling the vectors v1, . . . , vn+1 as required, we may assume that V = {v 1 , . . . , v k } is a maximal linearly independent subset of V = {v 1 , . . . , v n+1 }. Let M be an n-by-n matrix such that ui = M · vi for all vi ∈ V . Such a matrix always exists since the vectors in V are linearly independent. Now, for any i > k the set V ∪ {v i } is linearly dependent and therefore we can find c
Therefore, by the assumption of the lemma, there exists > k such that c
The algorithm works by building the vectors (c
. . , n + 1 and outputting the first one satisfying the requirement of the lemma.
We now prove Theorem 7.1. Assume that the set of outputs produced by the mix server is not a permutation of the set of inputs but cheating is detected with probability less than 3 8 − . We view the mix server as a polynomial-time randomized algorithm, and construct an algorithm A that uses the mix server to compute discrete logarithms in G. Algorithm A takes as input two values g and h in G and computes log g h as follows:
1. Algorithm A creates ElGamal public and private keys (the public key will be used to encrypt the inputs to the mix server). Algorithm A keeps the private key to itself and gives the public key to the mix server. Note that A is emulating the decryption servers.
A creates n inputs
Algorithm A submits ElGamal encryptions of the inputs a1, . . . , an to the mix server.
3. The mix server produces an output set of n ElGamal ciphertexts. Algorithm A decrypts these ciphertexts to obtain the set B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } ⊆ G of outputs.
4. Algorithm A generates a random subsets S ⊆ A by including every element of A independently at random with probability half. It challenges the mix server to reveal the subset F (S) ⊆ B of the outputs corresponding to S. Recall that the mix server must produce a subset F (S) ⊆ B such that |F (S)| = |S| and the product of the elements of F (S) equals the product of the elements of S. If the mix server does not reply to the challenge, algorithm A rewinds it and queries it on a different random subset until the mix server produces a reply. Since the mix server answers challenges with probability at least 5 8 + , the algorithm A needs to rewind the mix server less than twice on average.
5. Algorithm A repeats step 4 above n + 1 times, rewinding the mix server between queries. It obtains independent random subsets S 1 , . . . , S n+1 of the inputs and the corresponding replies F (S 1 ), . . . , F (S n+1 ) from the mix server.
Let χ(S) ∈ {0, 1}
n be the characteristic vector of S for any subset S of A or B. We view χ(S) ∈ {0, 1} n as a vector in Z n q . If there exists an n-by-n matrix M ∈ GL n (Z q ) such that for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1 the equality χ(S i ) = M · χ(F (S i )) holds, then algorithm A reports failure.
Otherwise, there is no matrix
holds for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1. By Lemma 7.2, we can then find in polynomial time c1, . . . , cn+1 ∈ Zq such that:
By definition of the mix server, we know that
. . , n + 1. By multiplying these n + 1 relations, we get
Recall
e j (r j + s j (log g h)) = 0 mod q.
If
P n j=1 ejsj = 0 then algorithm A reports failure. This happens with probability at most 1/q. Otherwise A outputs
Proposition 7.3. Suppose the mix server produces outputs which are not a permutation of the inputs, yet manages to reply to challenges with probability greater than 5 8 + . Then algorithm A succeeds in computing discrete logarithm with probability at least 2 /128 − 1/q.
Proof. By assumption, the mix server correctly answers a query with probability at least 5 8 + , where the probability is taken over all 2 n possible queries and the random bits used by the mix server. By a standard counting argument, if we randomly fix the mix server's random bits, then with probability at least /2 the mix server answers correctly at least 5 8 + 13 16 of all 2 n queries.
Once we fix the mix server's random bits, the set of queries that the mix server answers correctly is a well defined subset
n . Furthermore, we can view the mix server as a deterministic function F : S → {0, 1} n mapping subsets of inputs to subsets of outputs. We know that |S| > 2 n ( ).
n be the i-th unit vector (i.e. zeroes everywhere and a one in the i-th coordinate).
The following lemma will be used several times:
There exist v0, v1 ∈ S such that v1 = v0 + ei.
Proof. Let U be the subset of {0, 1} n containing all vectors with a one in position i. Let S 0 = S ∩Ū and let S 1 = S ∩ U . We define f : S 0 → U to be the map that
) is the pair of desired vectors.
Next, we bound the probability that algorithm A aborts in step 6. We separate our analysis of the bound in two cases, depending on whether F (S) spans all of Z n q or not.
We prove first that S must span all of Z n q when |S| > 2 n /2.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By the previous lemma, there n . Therefore, if we are given c linearly independent vectors v1, . . . , vc as above, the probability that a random vector from S is linearly dependent on v1, . . . , vc is at most 2 c /|S|. If follows that n random vectors from S span all of Z n q with probability at least
|S|
In what follows, all the logarithms are taken base 2. Since log 2 (1 − x) ≥ −2x for x ∈ [0, 1 2 ] and |S| > 2 n−1 , we have
+ ), we get p ≥ 2+4 . With < 1 2 , we get the desired result.
all of Z n q , then algorithm A does not abort in step 6 with probability at least /4.
Proof. By Lemma 7.6, we know that with probability at least /4, the first n vectors χ(S1), . . . , χ(Sn) ∈ {0, 1} n will span all of Z n q . But since F (S) does not span all of Z n q , the n vectors χ (F (S 1 )) , . . . , χ(F (S n )) ∈ {0, 1} n do not span all of Z n q . Therefore there is no matrix M ∈ GL n (Z q ) that maps χ(F (Si)) to χ(Si) for all i = 1, . . . , n and so the algorithm does not abort in step 6.
Next, we want to bound the probability of aborting in 
Then there exists a permutation matrix
n is a linear function, we can find an n-by-n matrix P such that for all S ∈ S, F (S) = P · S.
Note that the matrix P must be of full rank since F (S) spans all of Z n q . For i, j ∈ 1, . . . , n, we write pi,j the entry of P at row i and column j.
We start by showing that p i,j ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all i, j ∈ 1, . . . , n. Recall that for i = 1, . . . , n we denote the i-th unit vector by ei ∈ {0, 1} n . By Lemma 7.4, we can find
n . But since v 1 = v 0 + e i we have P e i = P v 1 − P v 0 . This shows that the vector P ei can be expressed as the difference between two vectors in {0, 1} n and therefore all the coordinates of P e i are in {−1, 0, 1}. But the vector P e i is exactly the i-th column of the matrix P . Since this argument works for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have shown that p i,j ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all i, j ∈ 1, . . . , n.
Recall the definition of the norm L given above. We have:
This implies the following equality, which we will use later:
Let us now consider row Ri = (pi,1, . . . , pi,n) of the matrix P for i ∈ 1, . . . , n. For any v ∈ S, we know that the scalar
n by assumption. This implies that the vector R i has at most 11 non-zero elements (either 1 or −1). Indeed, if Ri had z > 12 non-zero elements, it would map at most a fraction 2 z/2 z/4 /2 z/2 < 5/8 of vectors in {0, 1} n to {0, 1}. Up to a re-ordering of the columns of the matrix P , we can assume that the z ≤ 11 non-zero coordinates of Ri are the first z coordinates. An exhaustive search among all 2 1 + 2 2 + . . . + 2 11 = 2 12 − 2 possibilities of all vectors that map a fraction strictly greater than 5/8 of all vectors in {0, 1} n to {0, 1} reveals that every row R i of P must be of one of the following 4 types:
• Type 1: there is only 1 non-zero coordinate and its value is 1.
• Type 2: there are only 2 non-zero coordinates and their values are 1, 1.
• Type 3: there are only 2 non-zero coordinates and their values are 1, −1.
• Type 4: there are only 3 non-zero coordinates and their values are 1, 1, −1.
Note that no row can have all zero coordinates since the matrix P is of full rank. Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 be the number of rows of P of type 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Observe that t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 = n. We also know that
pi,j = n and therefore t 2 = t 3 . Now suppose t 2 ≥ 1. The matrix P then contains at least one row v 2 of type 2 and one row v3 of type 3. Up to symmetries and permutations on the columns of P , there are 4 distinct ways in which the nonzero coordinates of v 2 and v 3 can be arranged relative to one another:
All of these arrangements map at most a fraction 5/8 of all vectors in {0, 1} n to vectors in {0, 1} n . This means that t 2 = t 3 = 0.
It remains to show that t4 = 0. We proceed by contradiction. Assume there is at least one row v4 of type 4. Up to a re-ordering of the columns of P , we may assume v 4 = (−1, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) . Since L(P e 1 ) = 1, there are at least two other rows of P that have a 1 in the first column. These cannot both be of type 1 for otherwise they would be linearly dependent and that cannot happen since P is of full rank. Therefore there is at least one other row v 4 of type 4 which has a 1 in the first column. Up to symmetries and permutations on the columns of P , there are 4 distinct ways in which the non-zero coordinates of v4 and v 4 can be arranged relative to one another:
All of these arrangements map at most a fraction 5/8 of all vectors in {0, 1} n to vectors in {0, 1} n . This means that t 4 = 0. Therefore all the rows of P are of type 1 so that P is a permutation matrix. Proof. Consider the unit vector e j for j ∈ 1, . . . , n. Since P is a permutation matrix there exists a unit vector e i such that P ei = ej. By Lemma 7.4, we can find v, w ∈ S such that w = v + ei. Let us write the coordinates of v and w as v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ). We also write F (v) = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and F (w) = (w 1 , . . . , w n ). We have F (w) = P w = P v + P ei = F (v) + ej.
This implies that
Thus we must have bj = ai. The same reasoning holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which shows that the mix server didn't cheat. ) and F (S) spans all of Z n q , then algorithm A does not abort in step 6 with probability at least /64.
Proof. By Lemma 7.6, we know that with probability at least 1/32, the first n vectors in step 6 of algorithm A, χ(S1), . . . , χ(Sn) ∈ {0, 1} n will span all of Z n q . Let M ∈ GLn(Zq) be the unique matrix that maps χ(F (Si)) to χ(Si) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Let T ⊆ S be the subset of all the vectors v ∈ S such that v = M · F (v). By Lemmas 7.8 and 7.9, we know that |T | ≤ (5/8)2 n . Therefore the probability that the n + 1'st vector χ(Sn+1) in step 6 of algorithm A is not in T is at least 13 16 . When that happens, step 6 will not abort. The probability of not aborting in step 6 is therefore at least (1/32)( 13 16 ) ≥ /64 as required.
Proof of Proposition 7.3
To summarize, we prove here the lower bound given in Proposition 7.3 on the probability that algorithm A succeeds in outputting log g h. Algorithm A only ever aborts in steps 6 and 7. We know that the probability that A aborts in step 7 is at most 1/q. Furthermore, we have shown that with probability at least /2, we have |S| > 2 n ( 5 8 +
16
). When that happens:
• When F (S) does not span all of Z n q , the probability that A does not abort in step 6 is at least 1/32 by Lemma 7.7.
• When F (S) spans all of Z n q , the probability that A does not abort in step 6 is at least /64 by Lemma 7.10.
It follows that the probability of success of A is at least 2 /128 − 1/q.
CONCLUSION
The strongest point of our new mix network is its exceptional speed. The real cost of proving almost entirely correct mixing is orders of magnitude faster than all other mix networks. An almost entirely correct output is available instantly and can be announced long before it is confirmed by a slower perfectly correct mix network.
In practice, our new mix is of particular interest to large electronic elections (say, a million ballots or more), where a guarantee of almost entirely correct mixing may well be sufficient to announce the outcome of an election pending confirmation by a slower perfectly correct mixnet. This additional proof of perfect correctness does not require the ballots to be mixed again, and of course doesn't require any involvement from the voters.
We propose the first construction that exploits a trade-off between efficiency and correctness. An interesting direction for future work would be to study this trade-off further. In particular, it would be interesting to determine whether it is possible to build mix nets that span the entire continuum of the trade-off between efficiency and correctness.
